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The Quantum of Evidence Required
to Extradite from the United States
Robert J. Rosoff*
INTRODUCTION
When a foreign country requests the extradition of an alleged fugitive
from the United States, the suspect is protected from unjustified extradi-
tion in a number of ways. First, a valid extradition treaty must exist
between the two countries before the United States will extradite. 1 If there
is such a treaty, and a foreign government requests the extradition of an
individual, the executive cannot transfer the individual until a judicial
hearing is held. 2 At this hearing the requesting country must submit some
evidence of the suspect's criminality before extradition will be permitted. 3
This evidence production requirement is an Anglo-American practice that
most countries do not follow. 4
The amount of evidence that must be submitted by a requesting country
to obtain extradition from the United States is not specified by statute. 5
The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, simply calls for the magistrate to
permit extradition if "he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention ... ." 6 All
United States extradition treaties therefore contain a proviso specifying the
amount of evidence that will be required. 7
Most treaties contain a proviso stating that before the United States will
grant extradition, the requesting country must submit "such evidence of
criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive shall
be found, would justify his committment for trial had the crime or offense
been there committed." 8 In 1903 the United States Supreme Court inter-
preted the phrase "'laws of the place where the fugitive shall be found" to
require that the magistrate apply the bindover standard of the state of the
union where the alleged fugitive is found when assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence. 9 Thus, the traditional proviso incorporates the evidentiary
standard applied in state preliminary hearings, a proceeding which deter-
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mines if there is sufficient evidence to bind an accused over for a domestic
trial. 10
Within the last decade the United States has become concerned that the
application of different state bindover standards leads to inconsistent
treatment of extradition requests, because different amounts of evidence
are required to extradite from different states. 11 The proposed solution to
this problem is to modify all new extradition treaties to provide that
"extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient ac-
cording to the laws of the requested Party. . . to justify his commitment
for trial if the offense of which he is accused had been committed in its
territory ... ,, 12 The essential difference between the two provisos is that
the phrase "law of the place where the fugitive shall be found," which
refers to the state bindover standard, is replaced by "laws of the requested
Party," which refers to the federal bindover standard.
This article argues that it is appropriate to require that requesting coun-
tries meet the uniform federal bindover standard to obtain extradition
from the United States, rather than a more stringent state standard. The
federal bindover standard of probable cause accomplishes the purpose of
United States extradition procedure better than any other evidentiary
standard. It affords an alleged fugitive more protection from unjustified
extradition than is available in most countries. Furthermore, the reasons
advanced by advocates pf a more stringent bindover standard in the
domestic criminal setting do not apply to extradition hearings.
ACHIEVING CONSISTENT EVIDENTIARY
REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTRADITION
Although nearly all states require a finding of "probable cause" to bind a
suspect over for trial, 13 states require different amounts of evidence to
meet this standard. On the one hand, many states appear to require ap-
proximately the same amount of evidence to bind a suspect over for trial
as is required to arrest a suspect under the fourth amendment. 14 This
standard is met if the evidence introduced against the suspect provides "a
reasonable ground for the inference that the charge may be well founded.
... The proof need only be such as to afford good reason to believe that
the offense was committed and by the defendant." 15
On the other hand, Massachusetts, for example, requires more evidence
to bind over for trial than is required to arrest, and has explicitly defined
the amount of evidence required to bind over as a "directed verdict" rule:
The examining magistrate should view the case as if it were a trial and he
were required to rule on whether there is enough credible evidence to send
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the case to the jury. Thus the magistrate should dismiss the complaint when,
on the evidence presented, a trial court would be bound to acquit as a matter
of law.... 16
Although no evidentiary standard can provide a clear understanding of the
precise amount of evidence required, 17 the Massachusetts standard is
much more stringent than other standards. 18 Moreover, states even vary
in their application of the same standard. 19
The variety of state bindover standards raises problems in extradition
hearings because, when the traditional proviso is controlling, state bind-
over standards determine the sufficiency of the requesting country's evi-
dence. In 1903 the United States Supreme Court in Peftit v. Walshe 20 inter-
preted the traditional proviso to require that the magistrate apply the
bindover standard of the state of the union where the fugitive is ap-
prehended when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court rea-
soned that state rather than federal law should be applied because, at that
time, there was no federal law that could be applied. 21
Changing circumstances have eroded the justification for the Pettit rule.
Because of the promulgation of federal rules of criminal procedure, con-
tinued application of varying state standards no longer makes sense, 22
especially since extradition is a national act of the United States 23 and
these cases are almost invariably filed in the federal courts. 24 Yet even the
most recent extradition cases have consistently followed the Pettit interpre-
tation. 25 In Shapiro v. Ferrandina, the Second Circuit quoted Pettit on this
point and stated that, "[a]s both parties recognize, the phrase 'laws of the
place where the person sought shall be found' refers to the laws of the state
where the arrest occurs rather than to the laws of the United States." 26 In
Greci v. Birkness, 27 a 1976 case construing a new proviso, the First Circuit
commented that if it were confronted with the traditional proviso it would
apply the state bindover standard despite the lessened force of the Peltit
interpretation since the advent of federal rules governing criminal proce-
dure. 28
Because different state bindover standards require different amounts of
evidence, under the traditional proviso it is possible for a requesting coun-
try to submit evidence which is sufficient to obtain extradition from a state
with a probable cause bindover standard but insufficient to obtain extradi-
tion from a state with a higher bindover standard. In Greci the First Circuit
had to deal with this possibility when it interpreted a revised proviso in
the new United States-Italy extradition treaty. In Greci the alleged fugitive
was found in Massachusetts, one of the states which requires the most
evidence to bind over a suspect for trial. The court concluded that if the
revised proviso called for the Massachusetts bindover standard, then Ita-
ly's evidence would be insufficient to obtain extradition. 29 But if the
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revised proviso called for the federal bindover standard, as Italy contend-
ed, then Italy's evidence would be sufficient to obtain extradition.
The court examined the negotiating history of the treaty to determine
which standard the parties had intended to apply. During the 1970
negotiations with the United States on the new extradition treaty, Italy had
requested that the traditional proviso be changed. The Italian delegation
wanted federal law to be applied in assessing the sufficiency of evidence
rather than state law, and the U.S. negotiators agreed to change the treaty
language accordingly. Concluding that both the negotiating history and
the language of the treaty itself required application of the federal bind-
over standard, the First Circuit remanded the case to the district court so
a magistrate could assess the sufficiency of the evidence under the federal
bindover standard; apparently there was sufficient evidence to meet this
standard. 30
After the 1970 negotiations with Italy that led to the incorporation of
the revised proviso into the United States-Italy extradition treaty, the
United States decided to modify all of its new extradition treaties to
require application of the federal bindover standard rather than state stan-
dards. 31 There are two convincing reasons for this treaty modification.
First, since there are now federal rules of criminal procedure it no longer
makes sense to require federal courts, which hear extradition cases, to
apply state law. 32 Second, since extradition is a national act the amount
of evidence required to extradite from the United States should be deter-
mined by uniform national law rather than by various state laws. 33
THE MOST APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IN
AN EXTRADITION HEARING
Recognizing that a uniform standard should be applied to assess the suffi-
ciency of evidence required to extradite does not solve the problem of
which standard should be chosen. The federal bindover standard, 34
defined as probable cause to arrest under the fourth amendment, 35 appears
to be the minimum amount of evidence that could be submitted to obtain
extradition for two reasons. First, to justify extradition most U.S. extradi-
tion treaties (whether they contain the traditional proviso or the revised
proviso) require the requesting country to submit sufficient evidence to
bind a suspect over for trial under U.S. law. 36 Since this treaty requirement
adopts a United States rule of criminal procedure, its application is implic-
itly subject to constitutional limitations. Under the fourth amendment, a
suspect cannot be detained for trial without a "timely judicial determina-
tion of probable cause .... -37 The treaty language would thus seem to
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incorporate this standard to justify the accused's detention prior to extra-
dition.
Second, even if the treaty language does not demand this minimum
standard, dicta in Caltagirone v. Grant 38 suggests that a judicial finding of
probable cause to arrest for extradition purposes is constitutionally man-
dated. If the Constitution requires probable cause for the arrest of an alleged
fugitive, then U.S. authorities presumably could not extradite a fugitive
absent a finding of probable cause.
In Caltagirone, Italy applied for the provisional arrest of Francesco Caltigi-
rone pursuant to the extradition treaty with the United States. 39 Under the
section of the treaty authorizing provisional arrests, 40 either nation may
ask the other signatory to hold a suspect for forty-five days pending a
decision by the requesting country to seek formal extradition. On the basis
of Italy's request, U.S. authorities arrested Caltigirone and incarcerated
him without bail. Caltigirone challenged the validity of his arrest and
detention in the absence of any probable cause determination by a United
States judicial authority. The Second Circuit construed the ambiguous
treaty language to require a probable cause showing to support the provi-
sional arrest.
Although this treaty construction permitted the court to resolve the case
without reaching constitutional issues, the court was clearly concerned
with the constitutional implications of the arrest of an alleged fugitive
without a showing of probable cause:
[I]n the Government's view, a foreign state could apply for, and the Govern-
ment could effect, the unlimited detention of Caltigirone by stringing to-
gether an infinite strand of forty-five day provisional arrests, all without a
judicial determination of probable cause or a formal extradition request. This
elaboration of the Government's view raises grave questions concerning the
constitutional propriety of any interpretations of Article XIII [the provisional
arrest provision] which does not require a showing of probable cause.
We doubt that the tenuous relationship between an application for provi-
sional arrest and a subsequent request for extradition implicates a sufficiently
strong foreign policy interest in the executive to justify a departure from
usual fourth amendment protections. 41
Furthermore, in the court's view, holdings which deny fifth and sixth
amendment protections in extradition proceedings 42 are not dispositive on
the issue of fourth amendment applicability. Because an extradition hear-
ing is not deemed a trial or criminal proceeding, 43 the terms of these
amendments limit their applicability to extradition. 44 But, the fourth
amendment is not so limited. 45 Thus, a finding of probable cause presum-
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ably must precede the extradition of a fugitive, perhaps in the extradition
hearing itself or at least prior to the arrest.
While the probable cause to arrest may be the minimum standard for
extradition, a comparison of the extradition hearing to the preliminary
hearing is necessary to determine what the best standard is. Courts have
often compared extradition hearings to preliminary hearings, which are
judicial proceedings applicable to United States domestic criminal prosecu-
tions. In Benson v. McMahon 46 the United States Supreme Court held that
extradition hearings should be of the character of preliminary hearings,
and within the last decade courts have continued to compare extradition
hearings and preliminary hearings as a way of explaining what form extra-
dition hearings should take. 47
The preliminary hearing is held shortly after the arrest of a criminal
suspect. Its primary function is "to determine whether there is sufficient
indication that a crime has been committed by the accused to justify his
further detention and to screen out weak and unsubstantiated cases which
do not justify any further attention." 48 The evidentiary standard that
must be met to bind a suspect over for trial in a federal preliminary hearing
is "probable cause." 49 It is similar to the amount of evidence required to
issue an arrest warrant, and to hold a defendant at an initial appearance
who has been arrested without a warrant. 50 As noted previously, many
states also apply this standard. 51
Although commentators have apparently ignored the relative merits of
different U.S. evidentiary standards in the context of extradition 52 there
is extensive discussion of this topic in the preliminary hearing context. 53
Because of the similarity between the form of the extradition and prelimi-
nary hearings, and because the evidentiary standards for the preliminary
hearings have always been adopted for extradition hearings, it is valuable
to examine these discussions relating to the appropriate standard for
preliminary hearings. Some domestic courts and commentators have
proposed that a higher standard than probable cause be used in the bind-
over determination. The reasons for preferring a higher bindover standard
in domestic criminal proceedings are not, however, applicable in the con-
text of international extradition.
Congress required a preliminary hearing to assure that there was proba-
ble cause to arrest under the fourth amendment. 54 Commentators who
advocate a more stringent bindover standard believe that since the primary
function of the preliminary hearing is to screen out charges that should not
go to trial, more evidence should be presented than the amount required
for arrest. 55 They contend that the magistrate must refuse to bind over a
suspect at a preliminary hearing if the evidence presented is such that a
jury would not be permitted to convict. 56 Thus they advocate the directed
verdict standard that Massachusetts employs. 57
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One commentator 5 8 provides a helpful framework for understanding
the difference between preliminary hearings which use the "probable
cause to arrest" standard and those that use the "directed verdict" stan-
dard. He presents two alternative conceptual models of the preliminary
hearing, neither of which is employed in its pure form by any jurisdiction:
the "backward-looking" model and the "forward-looking" model.
The backward-looking model "stresses the preliminary and nonfinal
nature of the hearing and places emphasis upon the fact that the proceed-
ing is not a trial but is only an initial screening mechanism occurring very
shortly after the accused has been arrested." 59 Its primary concern is with
the legality of the arrest and the validity of the detention of the arrested
person. The bindover standard is therefore the same as probable cause to
arrest. The federal bindover standard and the standards of most states
correspond to the backward-looking model.
The primary concern of the forward-looking preliminary examination
"is whether there is a sufficient probability of conviction at trial to warrant
further proceedings." 60 This would be more akin to a trial since the con-
cern is with the legal guilt or innocence of the accused. The Massachusetts
standard corresponds to the forward-looking model.
Commentators have presented a number of reasons why a forward-
looking preliminary hearing is preferable to a backward-looking hearing;
for the most part these reasons do not apply to extradition hearings. The
primary reason in support of the forward-looking model is that, if insuffi-
cient evidence is presented to enable a jury to find the defendant guilty,
there is no justification for submitting the defendant and the state to the
costs of a full trial. 61 For this reason the forward-looking model allows the
defendant to raise affirmative defenses at the preliminary hearing. It is
futile to bind a defendant over for trial if he will be acquitted because he
has a valid affirmative defense. 62
Other reasons for requiring the higher "directed verdict" standard of
proof are that: it permits the defendant and the prosecutor to freeze the
testimony of witnesses and evidence before trial; it allows discovery of
evidence by both sides; it allows the prosecution to test its witnesses before
trial and helps to avoid the double jeopardy proscription if its case is
insufficient; it may encourage guilty pleas at earlier stages in the judicial
process; and it prevents unjustified incarceration of a defendant prior to
trial (if bail is unavailable). 63 An express assumption among those who
advocate a directed verdict standard at the preliminary hearing is that
police practices are now sufficiently sophisticated so that evidence of
criminality can be presented at a preliminary hearing immediately after
arrest: "it is difficult to defend binding over the defendant while the police
search for evidence that will support a conviction." 64
All but two of the reasons presented in favor of the directed verdict
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standard in preliminary hearings involve attempts to improve the function
of the trial. 65 These reasons are not relevant in the context of extradition
since the trial that will take place in the requesting country will not draw
on information gathered in the American extradition hearing. 66 The two
remaining reasons are intended to afford the defendant greater protection
-preventing unjustified incarceration prior to trial and reducing the possi-
bility that a trial will be held if sufficient evidence to convict is not present-
ed.
The issue of reducing unjustified pretrial incarceration will not be dis-
cussed here because modification of bail requirements for alleged fugitives
seems to be a better means of accomplishing this purpose than increasing
the evidentiary standard. 67 But the desire to afford a suspect greater pro-
tection from an unjustified trial is a valid reason for applying the directed
verdict standard in an extradition hearing. Many of the existing require-
ments of American extradition procedure are intended to protect the al-
leged fugitive from unjustified extradition, including the requirement that
the requesting country submit sufficient evidence of the suspect's criminal-
ity. 68
The United States, however, has a legal obligation to the requesting
country under an extradition treaty, 69 and the interest in fulfilling the
terms of the treaty should be balanced against the desire to protect the
alleged fugitive from unjustified extradition. American courts have con-
sistently held that an alleged fugitive is not entitled to a trial to protect
himself from extradition, 70 and that there is an obligation for the United
States to live up to its treaty obligations with other countries. As the
United States Supreme Court stated in Grin v. Shine, "[t]hese treaties should
be faithfully observed and interpreted, with a view to fulfilling our just
obligation to the other powers, without sacrificing the legal or constitu-
tio.nal rights of the accused." 71
The consequences imposed on a suspect who loses at an extradition
hearing are much more severe than those imposed after losing at a prelimi-
nary hearing. This suggests that a higher evidentiary standard would be
more appropriate at an extradition hearing. However, most countries do
not require a requesting country to submit any evidence of guilt prior to
extraditing a suspect. The United States already protects alleged fugitives
to a far greater extent than most countries. 72 Also, the constitutional rights
of an alleged fugitive are protected by the requirement that the requesting
country submit sufficient evidence to meet the probable cause to arrest
standard. 73 Foreign countries are already disturbed by this unusual re-
quirement because it makes extradition more difficult. 74 It would be con-
trary to American judicial precedent, 75 and would worsen our relations
with countries with whom we have extradition treaties, 76 to require that
they meet a directed verdict standard in the extradition hearing.
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Moreover, United States judges are not equipped to apply the directed
verdict standard in extradition hearings. If a directed verdict standard were
required in extradition hearings the magistrate would have to know the
substance of the crime to be able to assess whether a fact-finder could find
the accused guilty on the evidence presented. In this situation it would be
equally inappropriate to apply the substantive law of the United States or
the law of the foreign country.
It would not be fair to the requesting country if the magistrate assessed
the evidence in light of American substantive law requirements because
American law may impose different evidentiary requirements to find a
suspect guilty of a specific crime. It is conceivable that a requesting country
could submit evidence to support an extradition request that would be
sufficient to find the alleged fugitive guilty of the crime in that country,
but which would be insufficient under American law to send the case to
a jury.
It would also be unreasonable to require that the requesting country
submit sufficient information to the American magistrate so that he could
apply the directed verdict standard in light of the substantive law of the
requesting country. Although it would be possible to require the request-
ing country to submit an explanation of its criminal law so that the magis-
trate could apply the directed verdict standard, this would lead to complex
problems in the pleading and proof of the foreign law. 77 Also this would
create an extradition hearing which comes close to a trial on the merits
since the magistrate would have to conclude, after a judicial assessment of
the requesting country's evidence, that it would be possible to find the
accused guilty under the laws of that country. Although it is difficult to
specify exactly what constitutes probable cause, the magistrate only needs
to find a sufficient reason to believe that the suspect committed the act in
question. This should not be a difficult standard to apply. 78
CONCLUSION
U.S. treaties have traditionally required states requesting extradition to
submit enough evidence to comply with the bindover standard of the state
where the fugitive is found. Because of the varying state standards, magis-
trates in extradition hearings may not be able to decide consistently on
extradition requests. The decision to require that requesting countries meet
the federal bindover standard solves the problem of the inconsistent ap-
plication of United States extradition treaties. Moreover, the federal stan-
dard is superior because it affords an alleged fugitive significant protection
from unjustified extradition while taking account of our responsibilities to
foreign countries with whom we have extradition treaties.
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The present method of imposing the federal standard is, however, ques-
tionable. The United States is inserting the revised proviso into all new
extradition treaties, but the treaties are renegotiated infrequently. 79 As
long as a treaty contains the traditional proviso the possibility exists that
more evidence will have to be submitted to achieve extradition from states
which have a higher bindover standard. It would make more sense to revise
the United States extradition statute 80 so that it explicitly requires that the
requesting country submit sufficient evidence to meet the federal probable
cause standard. Foreign governments would have no reason to object to
such a change since the federal bindover standard is lower than some state
standards imposed on the requesting states under the old proviso.
Unfortunately, the proposed revisions of the extradition statute that are
currently before Congress do not explicitly call for the federal standard. 81
Congress should impose a uniform, federal standard to ensure consistency
in U.S. responses to extradition requests and to fairly balance the interests
of the accused and the requesting state.
NOTES
1 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (the duty to surrender an alleged
fugitive exists only when created by treaty); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211,1219 n.59 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972); McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F.Supp. 42, 47 (S.D.
Fla. 1981) (same). Other nations may choose in the exercise of comity to extradite alleged
fugitives to the United States in the absence of a treaty, but the Executive branch of the U.S.
government has no power to do this. Annot., 24 A.L.R. FED. 940, 942, 943-44 (1975).
This article does not discuss all the requirements for extradition from the U.S. For such
a description, see generally M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
502-537 (1974); Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary American Practice
and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 733 (1968-69); Note, United States Extradition Procedures,
16 N.Y.L.F. 420 (1970).
2 The right to a hearing is guaranteed by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976) (quoted, infra note
6), and is also guaranteed under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, Sayne v.
Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969) (the fifth amendment right may be satisfied by the
statutorily required hearing or by a habeas corpus review of an administrative decision to
extradite), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970).
3 I. A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-52 (1971).
4 Id. at 150. A number of other countries, however, do require some evidence of guilt to
extradite. Id. at 157-58.
5 This note will refer to different "amounts of evidence" required to extradite or to bind
a suspect over for trial. This is understood to mean the degree of probability of guilt that must
be established by evidence before extradition or bindover will be permitted.
Although there is no statutory provision setting a uniform standard for the amount of
evidence needed to extradite, 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976) specifies the type of evidence that may
be submitted by the requesting country. That section provides:
Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence upon the
hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as evidence on such
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hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and legally
authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals
of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have escaped, and the
certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident
in such foreign country shall be proof that the same, so offered, are authenticated in
the manner required.
A report jointly prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the Departments of Justice
and State, 126 CONG. REc. S13238 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) (report submitted by Sen. Kenne-
dy), describes the evidence that is customarily submitted by requesting countries as follows:
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in extradition proceedings, where unique
rules of wide latitude govern the reception of evidence on behalf of the foreign
government. It is settled law that hearsay is advisible, and the foreign government
usually presents its case by submitting affidavits, depositions and other written state-
ments in order to satisfy the requirements of the applicable treaty.
6 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976) reads as follows:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any magis-
trate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of
record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged,
that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such hearing, he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition
of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person,
according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant
for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until
such surrender shall be made.
7 E.g., Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3,1971, United States-Canada, Art. 10, para. 1, 27 U.S.T.
1022, T.I.A.S. No. 8237; Treaty on Extradition, June 22, 1972, United States-Denmark, Art.
6, para. 1, 25 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 7864; Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals, Apr.
29, 1886, United States-Japan, Art. V, para. 3, 24 Stat. 1015; T.S. No. 191.
8 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at S13238. E.g., supra note 7.
9 Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217,218 (1904). For the purposes of this article, the word
"state" will be used to refer to states of the union and the word "country" will be used to
refer to foreign countries.
10 A suspect can be bound over for trial in the United States in either a preliminary hearing
or a grand jury proceeding. However, in keeping with their tendency to analogize extradition
hearings to preliminary hearings, the courts in extradition cases have looked to the prelimi-
nary hearing bindover standard rather than the grand jury standard. See infra notes 46-53 and
accompanying text. The revised proviso, infra note 12 and accompanying text, has been
interpreted to call for the federal preliminary hearing standard (probable cause) rather than
the federal grand jury standard. See Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1980); CONG.
Rzc., supra note 5 at S13238. The distinction is important because there is some confusion
about whether the grand jury bindover standard is the same as the preliminary hearing
standard of probable cause. Some grand juries appear to require a prima facie case before a
suspect will be bound over for trial. See Y. KAMIsAR, W. LAFAv, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMIAL
PROCEDURE 1025-26 (5th ed. 1980). Because of this confusion and because of the judicial
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tendency to analogize the extradition hearing to the preliminary hearing, this note analyzes
the possible evidentiary standards by considering the standards employed in preliminary
hearings.
11 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at S13238.
12 Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 18,1973, United States-Italy, art. V, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S.
No. 8052 (an example of the new treaties containing the modified provision). See also CONG.
Rsc., supra note 5, at S13238 n.45.
13 Note, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L. J. 771,
776-77 n.21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Function of the Preliminary Hearing ]. See F. MILLER,
PROsEcUoON 83 (1969).
14 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 990 (5th ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as MODERNu CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]; Note, Function of the Preliminary Hearing, supra
note 13 at 776 n.21.
15 Note, Function of the Preliminary Hearing, supra note 13 at 776 n.21 (quoting the Administra-
tive Office of the United State's MANUAL FOR UNTrEo STATES COMMISSIONERS 10 (1948)).
The Supreme Court defined probable cause to arrest as follows:
Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the arresting
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an
offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 14 at 268 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175-76 (1949).
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) surveyed
a number of definitions of probable cause to arrest and stated:
[P]robable cause exists when known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed .... It is "a plastic concept whose existence depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case," Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S. App. D.C. 354,
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